

Operators for Propagating Trust and their Evaluation in Social Networks

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ABSTRACT

Trust is a crucial basis for interactions among parties in large, open systems. Yet, the scale and dynamism of such systems make it infeasible for each party to have a direct basis for trusting another party. For this reason, the participants in an open system must share information about trust. However, they should not automatically trust such shared information. This paper studies the problem of propagating trust in multiagent systems. It describes a new algebraic approach, shows some theoretical properties of it, and empirically evaluates it on two social network datasets. This evaluation incorporates a new methodology that involves dealing with opinions in an evidential setting.

1. INTRODUCTION

We consider autonomous parties such as people or businesses that interact with each other in modern information environments. Ultimately, whenever a party interacts with another, the two parties must trust each other sufficiently to be willing to carry out the desired interaction. In a general sense, a party Alice trusts another party Bob because Bob will provide what Alice expects [3].

Importantly, trust between a trusting and trusted party must have a basis in some direct *relationship* (and with respect to a relevant purpose). The relationship in question could be based on or arise from a commercial or social transaction, or through mere participation in common groups, or through an assessment of certain attributes that apply to each party. No matter what exact form the direct relationship takes, the scale of real systems is such that a party would feature in direct relationships with a relatively small number of others. Consequently, it would have reason to trust or distrust a relatively small subset of the parties with whom it might consider interacting.

The natural response to the above challenge is to enable the parties to share information with each other about whether and how much to trust others. It stands to reason, however, that trust need not propagate. For example, Alice may trust Bob and Bob may trust Charlie (and Alice may know this fact), but it may not be the case that Alice trusts Charlie. Although the above holds in general, in many practical settings, the propagation of trust is a reasonable description of what actually transpires. In real life, individuals and businesses give referrals and rely enormously on referrals to deter-

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mine with whom to interact [4]. Accordingly, we confine ourselves to the practical situations that do lend themselves to the propagation of trust. Such settings arise naturally whenever similarity in the needs of the various parties is a sufficient reason for the existence of trust. For example, to anticipate one of the datasets we study, if Alice trusts Bob’s opinions about movies and Bob trusts Charlie’s opinions about movies, then it stands to reason that Alice might trust Charlie’s opinions about movies.

Trust can be naturally multidimensional, including various aspects of competence and intent. The approach we describe below can accommodate multidimensionality but, for the sake of simplicity, we consider a single dimension and assume that it incorporates the aspect of trust in the sense of judging others and giving valuable referrals. Besides its simplicity, an important reason for this limited model is that the independently existing datasets upon which we empirically evaluate our approach do not lend themselves to multidimensional assessments.

Further, we generalize the conceptualization of evidence here to mean not necessarily empirical but any basis of positive and negative opinions, respectively. This is important for our application domain of social networks, where the base relationships arise from opinions (even prejudices), not from empirical evidence.

There are three contributions in this paper. First, we define three operators, *aggregation*, *concatenation*, and *selection*, for efficiently and accurately propagating trust in social networks. Second, we prove some useful formal properties of the operators. Third, in order to evaluate our approach, we present a transformation from subjective opinions to (presumed objective) evidential ratings.

2. BACKGROUND

From the standpoint of trust, a system of interacting agents is naturally modeled as a weighted directed graph, each of whose vertices correspond to an agent and each of whose edges corresponds to a direct relationship of trust from the agent at the source vertex to the agent at the target vertex, the weight on the edge being a measure of the trust placed. Conventionally, this weight is a scalar from the real interval $[0, 1]$. A path in such a graph thus corresponds to propagated trust and a weight on a path can be induced that reflects the measure of the trust propagated.

The earliest works on the propagation of trust assume that the propagation of trust along a path is multiplicative (e.g., the weighted average approach in [5]). For example, if Alice trusts Bob at 0.8 and Bob trusts Charlie at 0.7, then Alice is inferred as trusting Charlie at $0.8 \times 0.7 = 0.56$. This reflects the natural intuition that the measure of trust placed over a path falls as a path gets longer. (Our more nuanced approach captures this intuition as well.)

How trust is aggregated from more than one path is more challenging. An intuition is that the contributions of independent paths be added in some way, because they would reinforce each other. However, a simple addition of the path weights is generally inappropriate, because it would lead to double counting, and yield trust ratings greater than 1.0 unless somehow corrected.

Another challenge to trust propagation is the well-known *rumor problem*. What we would like to avoid are situations such as where Alice trusts Charlie because Bob told her he does and Bob trusts Charlie because Alice told him she does. We would like to make sure that there are no cycles in the flow of information. This is the reason that several trust propagation approaches represent only direct trust information in the graph models and use that information as the base for all their calculations of trust.

A common feature of most of the popular approaches for trust is that they measure the extent of trust via a scalar [6, 10, 13, 14, 24]. Although the scalar representation is simple, it is not well-suited to the propagation of trust. Following Jøsang, we model one party’s trust in another party in terms of a triple consisting of three scalars corresponding to belief (i.e., positive trust or belief about trust) b , disbelief (i.e., distrust or negative trust or belief of distrust) d , and uncertainty u . However, each triple $\langle b, d, u \rangle$ satisfies the constraint that $b + d + u = 1$ —hence, this representation supports not three but two degrees of freedom. The additional degree of freedom compared to the traditional one-scalar representation helps us represent the certainty of information. In Jøsang’s approach, the above triple representation is derived from a pair of numbers representing the positive evidence r and the negative evidence s , respectively, where $r + s > 0$. The $\langle b, d, u \rangle$ and $\langle r, s \rangle$ representations—called *belief* and *evidence* spaces, respectively—can be mapped to each other without loss of information. In notation, $\langle b, d, u \rangle = Z(\langle r, s \rangle)$ and $\langle r, s \rangle = Z^{-1}(\langle b, d, u \rangle)$, where Z is a suitable mapping [19]. An important property of our approach is that the expected probability of a good outcome $\alpha = \frac{r}{r+s} = \frac{b}{b+d}$.

Wang and Singh (W&S) [18, 19] adopt Jøsang’s framework [8], but deviate significantly from his approach. W&S base certainty on the strength, and not just the amount of evidence. First, for a given amount of evidence, increasing unanimity yields higher certainty. Second, holding the extent of the unanimity (or conflict) constant, an increasing amount of evidence yields increasing certainty.

Certainty provides a principled basis for propagating trust and distrust. For example, suppose Alice trusts Bob highly. Then, if Bob trusts Charlie highly, Alice would trust Charlie almost as highly. And, if Bob distrusts Charlie highly, Alice would distrust Charlie almost as highly as Bob does. In other words, even the propagation of distrust relies upon trust in the propagator. By contrast, if Alice distrusts Bob highly, then whether Bob trusts or distrusts Charlie, Alice would be uncertain about Charlie. It is impossible to capture the above nuances with a scalar representation.

3. APPROACH

Building on the above model of a social network as a graph, we propose a model called *CertProp* that handles the propagation of trust. CertProp is based on three operators. Concatenation or \otimes deals with the propagation of trust ratings along a path. Selection or \textcircled{S} chooses the most trustworthy path to each witness, whereas aggregation or \oplus deals with the combination of trust ratings from paths between the same source and target. The aggregation operator is due to Jøsang [8, 18]; the others are new here.

3.1 New Operator: Concatenation

Suppose Alice learns about Charlie from Bob. The extent of trust that Alice places in Charlie would be Bob’s trust in Charlie

discounted by Alice’s trust in Bob. Below, we use M_i to refer to a belief report of the form $\langle b, d, u \rangle$.

Let agent A place trust $M_1 = \langle b_1, d_1, u_1 \rangle$ in agent B ’s references and B place trust $M_2 = \langle b_2, d_2, u_2 \rangle$ in agent C . Then A ’s trust in C due to the reference from B can be calculated by the concatenation $M_1 \otimes M_2$, defined as follows.

DEFINITION 1. Concatenation \otimes . Let $M_1 = \langle b_1, d_1, u_1 \rangle$ and $M_2 = \langle b_2, d_2, u_2 \rangle$ be two belief functions. Define $M = M_1 \otimes M_2 = \langle b, d, u \rangle = Z(\langle b_1 r_2, b_1 s_2 \rangle)$, where $\langle r_2, s_2 \rangle = Z^{-1}(M_2)$.

The concatenation operator discounts B ’s trust in C by A ’s belief of B . For example, let Alice’s belief in Bob be 0.6, and Bob’s trust in Charlie be $\langle 10, 10 \rangle$. Then, instead of considering Bob’s reference directly, Alice discounts Bob’s reference by Alice’s belief. In other words, Alice’s trust in Charlie would be $\langle 6, 6 \rangle$.

3.2 Aggregation

The aggregation operator combines bodies of evidence. Consider a situation where Alice learns about David separately from both Bob and Charlie, and has factored in her trust for Bob and Charlie according to the above concatenation operator. What should be Alice’s combined trust in David? The answer depends upon the aggregation of the ratings obtained from two paths.

DEFINITION 2. Aggregation \oplus . Let $M_1 = \langle b_1, d_1, u_1 \rangle$ and $M_2 = \langle b_2, d_2, u_2 \rangle$ describe ratings computed from two disjoint paths between the same source and target. Then $M_1 \oplus M_2 = Z(Z^{-1}(M_1) + Z^{-1}(M_2))$

The intuition is to combine trust from two different sources by simply adding the evidence together. For example, Alice learns about Dave from Bob and Charlie. Alice’s concatenated trusts in Dave from Bob and Charlie are $\langle 10, 10 \rangle$ and $\langle 5, 5 \rangle$, respectively. Thus, in total, Alice’s trust in Dave would be $\langle 15, 15 \rangle$.

3.3 Applying Concatenation and Aggregation

Consider agent A with neighbors $\{B_1, \dots, B_m\}$, whom A trusts M_1, \dots, M_m , respectively. Let B_i ’s trust in the target C be M'_i . Then we can infer the trust placed by A in C , M as

$$M = (M_1 \otimes M'_1) \oplus (M_2 \otimes M'_2) \oplus \dots \oplus (M_m \otimes M'_m)$$

If a neighbor has not yet computed its trust in C , we can run the algorithm recursively to obtain the trust from merging and combining the trust from the neighbor’s neighbors, and so on, until we get to the witnesses whose trust values in C are computed from their direct interactions with C . So the trust ratings are merged in a bottom up fashion, from the leaves of the trust network up to its root A .

3.4 New Operator: Selection

The above approach in essence enumerates all paths from the originating agent to the target, and then uses the concatenation operator to combine beliefs along each path, and the aggregation operator to combine beliefs from all paths. But there is a problem in doing so. For example, in Figure 1, witness W_i reports 1 positive and 1 negative experiences with the target to both B_1 and B_2 . A should not use the aggregation operator \oplus to combine the beliefs from B_1 and B_2 , since their beliefs originate at the same source.

So how may A combine beliefs that come from the same source, but propagate via different paths? We define the *selection* operator, \textcircled{S} , to select one out of multiple paths that end at the same point. This operator selects the path that offers the highest belief. Using

any other path would lose valuable information. Adding a path would cause double counting. In Figure 1, we have two paths: $P_1 = A \rightarrow B_1 \rightarrow W_i$, and $P_2 = A \rightarrow B_2 \rightarrow W_i$. Let A 's trust in B_1 and B_2 be M_1 and M_2 , respectively, B_1 and B_2 's trust in W_i be M'_1 and M'_2 , respectively, and W_i 's trust in C be M_W . Suppose the trust concatenated along P_1 is $M_W \otimes M'_1 \otimes M_1 = \langle 0.6, 0.3, 0.1 \rangle$, and the trust concatenated along P_2 is $M_W \otimes M'_2 \otimes M_2 = \langle 0.5, 0.25, 0.25 \rangle$. We pick the most reliable path from A to W_i . Since $M_W \otimes M'_1 \otimes M_1 > M_W \otimes M'_2 \otimes M_2$ ($0.6 > 0.5$), so P_1 is the most reliable path. So $(M_W \otimes M'_1 \otimes M_1) \oplus (M_W \otimes M'_2 \otimes M_2) = M_W \otimes M'_1 \otimes M_1$.




Figure 1: Selection operator \otimes

DEFINITION 3. *Selection operator \otimes .* Let P_1 and P_2 be two paths from A to W . Let $M_1 = \langle b_1, d_1, u_1 \rangle$ be the trust concatenated along P_1 , $M_2 = \langle b_2, d_2, u_2 \rangle$ be the trust concatenated along P_2 . Then if $b_1 \geq b_2$, then $M_1 \otimes M_2 = M_1$, otherwise $M_1 \otimes M_2 = M_2$.

3.5 Applying Concatenation, Aggregation, and Selection

For a given trust network, to propagate trust of A with C , we combine beliefs as following. Using selection, we find the best path (to a fixed depth) from A to each witness. Then we concatenate beliefs along this path. The resulting belief is the consolidated belief supported by that witness. Then we combine all beliefs supported by all witnesses by using aggregation.

For example, in Figure 2, by applying all three operators, the propagated trust is $M = ((M_1 \otimes M'_1) \oplus (M_2 \otimes M'_2) \oplus (M_3 \otimes M'_3)) \otimes M_5 \oplus (M_4 \otimes M'_4)$.

To illustrate the double counting problem without selection in Figure 2, let $M_1 \otimes M'_1 = \langle 0.8, 0.1, 0.1 \rangle$, $M_2 \otimes M'_2 = \langle 0.6, 0.2, 0.2 \rangle$, $M_3 \otimes M'_3 = \langle 0.6, 0.3, 0.1 \rangle$, $Z^{-1}(M_5) = \langle 50, 5 \rangle$, $M_4 = \langle 0.9, 0.05, 0.05 \rangle$, and $Z^{-1}(M'_4) = \langle 20, 0 \rangle$. The actual trust of C is M , where $Z^{-1}(M) = Z^{-1}(M_5) \oplus Z^{-1}(M'_4) = \langle 70, 5 \rangle$. However, by applying only concatenation and aggregation, the estimated trust $Z^{-1}(M) = Z^{-1}(((M_1 \otimes M'_1) \oplus (M_2 \otimes M'_2) \oplus (M_3 \otimes M'_3)) \otimes M_5) \oplus (M_4 \otimes M'_4) = \langle 118, 10 \rangle$, which double-counts M_5 . This shows that multiple paths via the same witness can lead to double-counting. Double counting is especially obvious when the aggregated belief of the paths from the source to a witness is greater than one, but can occur otherwise too.

4. PROPERTIES

To propagate trust meaningfully and efficiently, we desire certain properties of the three operators. CertProp follows W&S's [18] aggregation (based on Jøsang [8] but with a different Z), but different concatenation and selection. W&S showed that aggregation is associative and commutative. Now we establish some useful properties of concatenation and selection.

THEOREM 1. *Selection \otimes is commutative and associative.*




Figure 2: Trust propagation in a social network

PROOF. Below, let $M_i = \langle b_i, d_i, u_i \rangle$. To show $M_1 \otimes M_2 = M_2 \otimes M_1$, suppose $M_1 \otimes M_2 = M_1$, which means $b_1 > b_2$. Thus, $M_2 \otimes M_1 = M_1$. And, similarly for M_2 .

To show $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \otimes M_3) = (M_1 \otimes M_2) \otimes M_3$:

Case 1 : Suppose b_1 is larger than b_2 and b_3 . If $b_2 \geq b_3$. Then $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \otimes M_3) = M_1 = M_1 \otimes M_3 = (M_1 \otimes M_2) \otimes M_3$. If $b_2 < b_3$, then $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \otimes M_3) = M_1 \otimes M_3 = M_1 = M_1 \otimes M_3 = (M_1 \otimes M_2) \otimes M_3$.

Case 2 : Suppose b_2 is larger than b_1 and b_3 . Then $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \otimes M_3) = M_1 \otimes M_2 = M_2 = M_2 \otimes M_3 = (M_1 \otimes M_2) \otimes M_3$.

Case 3 : Suppose b_3 is larger than b_1 and b_2 . Then $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \otimes M_3) = M_1 \otimes M_3 = M_3 = (M_1 \otimes M_2) \otimes M_3$.

Thus, $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \otimes M_3) = (M_1 \otimes M_2) \otimes M_3$. \square

THEOREM 2. *Concatenation \otimes distributes over aggregation \oplus .*

PROOF. We need to prove that $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \oplus M_3) = (M_1 \otimes M_2) \oplus (M_1 \otimes M_3)$. Assume the equivalent evidence corresponding to M_2 and M_3 is $\langle r_2, s_2 \rangle$ and $\langle r_3, s_3 \rangle$, respectively. Let $M_1 = \langle b_1, d_1, u_1 \rangle$. Then the equivalent evidence corresponding to $M_1 \otimes (M_2 \oplus M_3)$ is $\langle b_1(r_2 + r_3), b_1(s_2 + s_3) \rangle$. The evidence corresponding to $(M_1 \otimes M_2) \oplus (M_1 \otimes M_3)$ is $\langle b_1(r_2), b_1(s_2) \rangle \oplus \langle b_1(r_3), b_1(s_3) \rangle = \langle b_1(r_2 + r_3), b_1(s_2 + s_3) \rangle$, which completes the proof. \square

CONJECTURE 1. *Concatenation \otimes distributes over selection \otimes .*

5. EVALUATING TRUST PROPAGATION

It is difficult to evaluate an approach such as ours on real data because large networks of agents interacting with one another do not yet exist. For this reason, we adapt two datasets of social networks, namely, FilmTrust and a PGP key ring. Each dataset is naturally modeled as a weighted directed graph.

Some trust propagation models, e.g., [21], distinguish trust in *expertise* (i.e., ability of providing services) from trust in *sociality* (i.e., ability of providing referrals). Unfortunately, in datasets like FilmTrust and PGP, there is no such differentiation, although our model can accommodate this distinction.

We use the following strategy for evaluating a trust propagation algorithm over a graph. Typical networks carry a lot of redundancy, which we can exploit to evaluate the effectiveness of an approach for propagation [10]. The information associated with any specific edge may be induced from the other relevant edges, namely, those that fall on a sufficiently small path from the source to the target (of the given edge).

Specifically, let there be an edge from agent A to agent B of weight d_{AB} (denoting actual trust). We remove this edge temporarily and estimate the propagated trust i_{AB} between A and B based on paths from A to B . The difference between d_{AB} and i_{AB} reflects how effective an algorithm is at inferring the relationship between two agents. In essence, the elided direct relationship of weight d_{AB} yields the ground truth with which to evaluate the propagation.

5.1 Accuracy Metrics

To compare the propagated trust with the actual trust (the weight of the direct edge), we introduce two metrics: P -error and B -error, which are defined in evidence and belief space, respectively. Let $M_1 = \langle b_1, d_1, u_1 \rangle$, where $Z^{-1}(M_1) = \langle r_1, s_1 \rangle$, and $M_2 = \langle b_2, d_2, u_2 \rangle$, where $Z^{-1}(M_2) = \langle r_2, s_2 \rangle$. The P -error between M_1 and M_2 is $|\alpha_1 - \alpha_2|$, where (as above) $\alpha_i = \frac{r_i}{r_i + s_i}$. The B -error of M_1 and M_2 is defined as $|b_1 - b_2|$. Importantly P -error provides a metric for comparing our approach with single-valued trust representations like TidalTrust [10], whereas B -error yields more accurate comparison because it considers the certainty of the trust ratings. B -error is more sensitive because it is low if either (a) two certainties are close, or (b) P -error is low.

5.2 Trust Models and Search Strategies

Note that we find paths within a fixed length for the following reasons. First, it is computationally expensive to find all paths in a huge social graph. Besides, shorter paths yield better accuracy in general because longer chains are weaker [10, 22]. However, a trade-off still exists. Deeper search may yield more evidence, but takes more time. Shallow search may give us accurate evidence quickly, but may not find any path. Thus, we propose three strategies. The *shortest* strategy first finds the shortest path from A to B , and then find all paths within that length. The *fixed* strategy searches all paths within a specified depth. In our experiments, we set this depth to seven to make sure we find at least one path for all connected pairs in the dataset. The *selection* strategy yields the most trusted paths to each witness found by *fixed*. We compare our approach, CertProp, to W&S [18]. To show the influence of the trust models and the strategies, we define three variants for both W&S and CertProp, which Table 1 summarizes.

Model Name	\oplus	\otimes	\textcircled{S}	Path
W&S (shortest)	W&S	W&S	No	Shortest
W&S (fixed)		W&S	No	Fixed
W&S (selection)		W&S	Yes	Fixed
CertProp (shortest)	W&S	New	No	Shortest
CertProp (fixed)		New	No	Fixed
CertProp (selection)		New	Yes	Fixed

Table 1: Variants of W&S and CertProp studied here

5.3 From Opinions to Evidence

Using the available social network datasets poses two challenges. One, the weights used in these networks are integers whereas our approach needs two reals, namely, $\langle b, d, u \rangle$ (with $b + d + u = 1$). Two, the weights are subjective opinions and not evidence. Accordingly we propose heuristics for mapping opinions to evidence, so they become amenable to our approach. We propose two approaches to transform opinions into evidence: (1) *linear* and (2) *Weber-Fechner*. We consider subjective ratings drawn from a scale such as 1 to 10 (FilmTrust), 1 to 4 (PGP), and so on.

The idea of the *linear* transformation is normalization. In our representation, the ratings at the end points (intuitively, reflecting unanimity of various considerations) correspond to a lower uncertainty u than those in the middle. Further, the belief b derived from a rating of 10 should be the highest and that derived from a rating of 1 the lowest. Therefore, we translate a FilmTrust rating to our trust value $\langle r, s \rangle$ by simply interpreting the single number as the number of positive experiences r relative to a fixed total number of experiences of 10. For example, we translate an opinion rating of 4 to evidence $\langle r, s \rangle = \langle 4, 6 \rangle$. Likewise, we translate a PGP rating of 3 to $\langle 3, 1 \rangle$. Although this approach is simplistic, it provides us the metrics to compare with other trust propagation methods.

The *Weber-Fechner* transformation satisfies two observations. It is based on the *Weber-Fechner “law”* [2], which says the relationship between stimulus and perception is logarithmic. If a stimulus (i.e., good experience) is tripled in strength, the corresponding perception (i.e., opinion ratings) will be three steps above the original value. For example, suppose agent A has 10 good transactions with agent B , and A ’s opinion rating about B is three. A ’s opinion rating about B will be four if A has 20 more good transactions. Second, as always, in our approach, the certainty of the object rating corresponding to the average opinion should be the lowest. Based on these observations, we define a transformation function to transform opinions into evidence.

DEFINITION 4. *Weber-Fechner Transformation. Suppose Σ is the set of normalized opinion ratings. Let A, P, U be the average, the most popular, and the least popular opinion in Σ , respectively. Then $W(\sigma \in \Sigma) = \langle k^{\sigma/A}, k \rangle$ is the transformation from opinions into evidence, where $k = \ln \left(\frac{\#P - \#U}{|P - U|} + e \right)$, $\#P$ and $\#U$ are the counts of P and U in the given dataset.*

The intuition behind k is to capture the slope between the numbers of the most and least popular opinions. If k is larger, the difference of the probabilities between the transformed ratings corresponding to two successive opinions will be bigger. For example, the number of the most and least popular opinions in FilmTrust and PGP are 199, 308, and 202, respectively, which means it requires more positive evidence to increase the opinions by one in PGP than it does in FilmTrust. We add a correction e to make sure k is greater than one. The exponent σ/A captures the logarithmic relationship between evidence and ratings.

For example, in the FilmTrust dataset, the average of normalized opinions is 0.68, the most and least popular normalized opinions are 0.7 and 0.2, which have 228 and 26 counts, respectively. Then, $W(0.3) = \langle 2.21, 6.01 \rangle$, and $W(0.7) = \langle 6.33, 6.01 \rangle$.

Figure 3 compares the certainties of *linear* and *Weber-Fechner* transformed ratings in the FilmTrust and PGP dataset. With *Weber-Fechner*, the average rating has the lowest certainty, but not with *linear* (in PGP). In FilmTrust, the average normalized rating is close to 0.7, while the average rating in the PGP dataset is close to 1, which is the default value in PGP setting. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 show how these transformations affect the results.

5.4 FilmTrust

Our first evaluation is based on *FilmTrust* [10, 11], a small social network of film buffs. In this dataset, the 538 vertices represent agents (users) and the 1,234 directed edges represent their trust relationships with other users. The weight of an edge is an integer in $[1, 10]$, which reflects the strength of the source agent’s qualitative rating or opinion of the target agent.

Katz and Golbeck’s [10] algorithm, TidalTrust, collects trust data from all referral paths with the shortest length from a source to a




Figure 3: Rating distributions and associated certainties

sink. It selects referral paths with strength above a threshold and uses them to compute the overall trust value.

Kuter and Golbeck’s [11] trust inference model, *Sunny*, provides a confidence measurement based on probabilistic sampling. *Sunny* exhaustively finds all possible paths from a source to a sink. The confidence measurements in *Sunny*, *W&S*, and *CertProp*, reduce the influence of path length—longer paths contribute less to the overall result than shorter ones. But considering additional paths provides access to more opinions, and can yield more accurate inference.

Figure 4 shows the paths found by the *fixed* variant, which exhaustively searches all paths within the fixed length three from the source to a sink (diamond), after the directed edge (dashed arrow) is removed. In this case, we are left with two paths of length two and 13 paths of length three. The *shortest* variant only finds the two paths in the shortest length, which is two. Conversely, the *fixed* strategy considers all 15 paths of up to a fixed length of three. Our experiments below show how search strategies affect the accuracy of the propagation.




Figure 4: Paths of length less than or equal to three from a source (solid rectangle) to a sink

Figure 5 shows the average *P-errors* of *TidalTrust*, *Sunny*, *W&S*, and *CertProp*. The *shortest* variant has similar performance to *Sunny*, which outperforms *TidalTrust*. The *fixed* variant has the best performance with both *W&S* and *CertProp*.

To provide more insightful comparisons among the variants of *W&S* and *CertProp*, Figure 6 shows both *P-error* and *B-error* with different search strategies. We draw three conclusions. First, the *fixed* variant yields higher certainty (reflecting the additional evidence found) than the *shortest*, which indicates the former provides




Figure 5: Average *P-errors* evaluated on FilmTrust

better estimates by considering more evidence (paths). Second, although *CertProp* and *W&S* have similar *P-errors* in both *linear* and *Weber-Fechner* cases, *CertProp* has a lower *B-error* (more accurate). This is because *CertProp* has better concatenation operator, which we further discuss in Section 5.6. Third, both *CertProp* and *W&S* yield better performance in the *Weber-Fechner* case. This shows that the *Weber-Fechner* transformation successfully reduces the effect of subjectivity in FilmTrust. The subjectivity of the opinions decreases the accuracy of *CertProp* and *W&S*.




Figure 6: Average *P-errors* and *B-errors* with different search strategies, evaluated on FilmTrust with *linear* and *Weber-Fechner* transformations

To show more evidence of how the amount of evidence affects prediction accuracy, we use random-walk sampling [12] to generate five 25% samples. The sampling method preserves the statistical properties, such as degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and so on, with a moderate sampling size of 15% to 25%. As Figure 7 shows, the confidence of the prediction increases with the number of paths found. Also the average ratings, the depth of the paths found, and the *P-errors* from the sample data are similar to the re-

sults from the whole FilmTrust data. We apply the same sampling method in Section 5.5 to reduce the size of the PGP dataset.




Figure 7: The results of CertProp (fixed) on the sampling data, showing the certainty increases with the number of the paths found, while the average rating, the depth of paths found, and P-error are preserved by the random-walk sampling method

5.5 PGP Web of Trust

The *web of trust* is a concept used in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). The main idea is that instead of relying on centralized certificate authorities, the web of trust establishes a decentralized trust model of public keys, in order to verify the authenticity of the bindings between users and their public keys.

For example, user C receives a digitally signed email from user S . C needs S 's public key to verify the digital signature. However, a fake public key can be easily created with S 's name. To verify the authenticity of the public key, one simple way is to find another trustworthy user who can confirm the public key belongs to S . In other words, the authenticity of the public key of S can be verified if C can find a user who signs the public key of S . This is called a *signature relation*. The web of trust is a directed graph representing the signature relation among users. Each vertex represents a user, and an edge from user A to user B means the public key of B is signed by user A . Besides, an integer trust value in $[1, 4]$ is associated with each edge to indicate the strength of the relation. To verify the authenticity of S , C needs to find a path (a confirmation chain of signature relations) to reach S . There could be more than one path between two users. The more disjoint paths exist the harder it is to fake the confirmation chain.

We repeat the experiment of Section 5.4 on the PGP dataset. The web of trust data is collected from the PGP server snapshot [1] on June 5, 2008. It consists of 39,246 vertices and 317,979 edges. The average distance (i.e., the shortest path) of all vertex pairs is around 6. We sample the graph to scale down the size of the data using random-walk sampling [12].

We compare CertProp with W&S and a trust propagation approach, *Naive*. In Naive trust propagation, concatenation is defined as the multiplication of the probabilities $\alpha = \frac{r}{r+s}$. Aggregation is defined by the average of the probabilities. There is no certainty concept in Naive.

Figure 8 compares CertProp with W&S and Naive. Just as for FilmTrust, CertProp has similar performance with respect to P -errors, but outperforms W&S in B -errors. Naive is the worst among the three approaches. Also, in *Weber-Fechner* case, both Cert-

Prop and W&S improve, but the concatenation operator of Cert-Prop yields greater improvement than W&S.




Figure 8: Average P-errors and B-errors of W&S, Naive, and CertProp, with different search strategies, evaluated on PGP with linear and Weber-Fechner transformations

5.6 Discussion

We can draw the following conclusions from the evaluation in Sections 5.4 and 5.5.

Overall Performance of CertProp and W&S CertProp (*fixed*) is the best trust propagation approach in both datasets. In general, CertProp is more accurate and efficient than W&S in terms of B -error, although they have similar P -errors. As Section 5.1 argues, B -error estimates the accuracy of probability-certainty trust better than P -error. Besides, CertProp and W&S both have smaller P -errors than Sunny and TidalTrust in FilmTrust, and Naive in PGP.

Performance of Search Strategies The *fixed* variant is generally more accurate than *shortest*, whereas the *selection* variant is outperformed by *fixed* in FilmTrust but has similar performance as *fixed* in PGP. In most cases, *selection* does not perform well because it ignores too much evidence.

Performance of \otimes in CertProp and W&S The main difference between CertProp and W&S is in their concatenation operators. CertProp concatenation discounts the evidence of the referral by the belief of the referrer, whereas W&S concatenation discounts the belief of the referral by the belief of the referrer. The certainty of concatenated trust in CertProp is generally higher than in W&S, because the belief can be viewed as certainty-discounted evidence. The results in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 indicate the concatenation in CertProp has better accuracy than W&S.

Further, CertProp concatenation works evidence space. In other words, it requires no Z^{-1} mapping [18] (as described in Section 2). To show how Z^{-1} mapping affects the efficiency, we compute the concatenation of two trust ratings, M_1 and M_2 , where $Z^{-1}(M_1) = \langle r_1, s_1 \rangle$ and $Z^{-1}(M_2) = \langle r_2, s_2 \rangle$. Each of r_1, s_1, r_2, s_2 is an integer ranging over $[1, 100]$. We consider all combinations represented by the

Cartesian product $r_1 \times s_1 \times r_2 \times s_2$. Thus, there are 10^8 combinations. Generally, the Z^{-1} mapping can be approximated using binary search or Newton’s method [19]. Instead of computing it in real-time, we build a look-up table in advance. Despite the speed up of Z^{-1} , we find that each CertProp concatenation takes on average 0.12 milliseconds, whereas W&S takes 133.37 milliseconds.¹

Performance of \textcircled{S} in CertProp and W&S The selection operator \textcircled{S} does not help in either W&S or CertProp. We observed that, in datasets like FilmTrust, opinions are assigned by users, who trust others not based on evidence, but primarily based on subjective impressions. For example, A may give B a high opinion just because everybody trusts B . Selection is helpful only in evidence-based datasets where double counting is undesirable. In other cases, selection is overly cautious and ignores too much evidence when a witness can be reached by many paths.

However, the *selection* result verifies the observation made by Katz and Golbeck [10]—shorter paths have more accurate trust inference for a fixed trust rating. As Figure 9 shows, in FilmTrust, shortest paths tend to be more trustworthy because they are selected more by the selection \textcircled{S} operator. For example, over 90% of paths of length of two are selected. The PGP evaluation yields a similar result.




Figure 9: The distribution of the length of the paths found by CertProp (selection). Shorter paths tend to be more trustworthy and hence are selected more by selection.

Performance of Linear and Weber-Fechner Transformation Our evaluation shows that, for opinion networks, evidence-based trust propagation approaches, like CertProp and W&S, are more accurate in *Weber-Fechner* transformed graphs than *linear* transformed ones. This result verifies our assumption that the opinions in the datasets are subjective. Also it indicates *Weber-Fechner* transformation can reduce such subjectivity, whereas *linear* transformation fails to reduce the subjective because it cannot adapt different properties of the datasets.

Selection based on Certainty vs. Selection based on Belief Note that, to prevent from double counting, we can also consider

¹The experiment is conducted on MacBook Pro with 2.16 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo, and 2 GB 667 MHz DDR2 SDRAM, in Java Run-time Environment 5.0.

selection based on certainty, or *c-selection*, which means, instead of choosing the path with the most belief b , we choose the path with the most certainty c . However, the result shows, *c-selection* performs worse than *selection* with both *P-error* and *B-error*, especially *B-error*. For example, in FilmTrust with linear transformation, CertProp (*c-selection*) has *P-error* 0.1780 and *B-error* 0.347, whereas CertProp (*selection*) has 0.1783 and 0.350. This is as a result of lack of evidence. Although *c-selection* chooses the most certain path, the chosen path may be either with the most disbelief d or the most belief b . The former case makes the estimated trust less evidential, in other words, with a small belief b . Conversely, *selection* makes sure the chosen path is the latter case, with the most belief rather than disbelief.

6. LITERATURE

Trust models are widely studied in various domains. Trust propagation methods can be categorized as the models that consider witness information sources [17], or retrieve and aggregate ratings from a social network [15]. Here, we focus on trust propagation approaches not covered in the above surveys.

Richardson *et al.* [16] discuss an abstract framework for trust propagation. Each user maintains trust in a small number of other users. A user’s trust in any other user can be computed by using the existing web of trust recursively. Richardson *et al.* first enumerate all paths between the user and every other user who has a local belief in a given statement. Next they calculate the belief associated with each path by using a concatenation operator along each path, and combine the beliefs associated with all paths using a predefined aggregation operator. However, they do not consider double counting. Wang and Singh [18, 19] present path algebra for trust propagation, and define aggregation and concatenation. We use their aggregation but our concatenation operator is different (and faster) than theirs without loss of accuracy. We also introduce a new selection operator to avoid possible double counting in trust networks.

Yu and Singh [20, 21] study distributed reputation management in a social network whose member agents cooperate with each other to find the trustworthiness of other agents. To find the trustworthiness of a service provider, an agent uses the referral network to find witnesses, and combines the beliefs of those witnesses regarding the service provider. Yu and Singh’s approach is based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. It treats a service with medium quality as of unknown quality, not as a known medium quality. More importantly, it does not completely address double counting in that multiple paths through the same agent are treated as if they were independent. Although the approach identifies witnesses who have direct experience, so there is no double counting at that level.

Gray *et al.* [6] address trust propagation in mobile ad hoc networks. They calculate concatenation as the average of trust of each edge along the referral path, where the trust of edges is discounted by the depth in the referral path. Trust from different paths is aggregated by choosing the most trusted of the available paths. Quercia *et al.* [14] also propagate trust in mobile network context. Based on the web of trust, they build *relationship graphs* where nodes are relationships. Two *related* nodes are linked if they are either from the same rater or rating the same person. At the beginning, some of nodes are rated at the first place. Then trust is propagated from rated nodes to unrated ones by computing a *predictive* function. However, the number of relationships in real-world networks is much larger than the number of nodes. For example, there are 1,234 edges (538 nodes) in FilmTrust, and 317,979 edges

(39, 246 nodes) in PGP. Propagating trust in the corresponding relationship graphs would be more computationally expensive. The operators for propagating trust in our approach take advantage of well-defined certainty and belief of trust with proved mathematical properties. Also, our approach provides accurate propagated trust with a small fixed propagation depth.

Trust management in peer-to-peer systems has been widely studied [9, 23]. Spectral decomposition is used on the adjacency matrix of the network graph to estimate global reputation, which is also called the *global group* trust metric [24]. Guha *et al.* [7] associate trust relations to matrix operations. For example, the commutativity of trust is associated to matrix transpose, while direct propagation is associated to matrix multiplication. Different from global group methods, our approach models trust from a personal perspective. Propagated trust takes into account personal bias. Besides, matrix approaches require several iterations to converge.

Advogate [13] and Applesseed [24] are two *local group* trust metrics, which propagate global trust only on the local subgraph. Advogate applies network flow on a modified graph, where capacities are assigned to edges based on the depth in the referral path. The deeper the edge is the less capacity it has. Conversely, Applesseed adopts *spreading activation*. It spreads *energy* across the graph, and, when propagating through a node, divides energy among successors based on the edge weights. The idea of Applesseed is similar to spectral decomposition and requires several iterations to converge. CertProp propagates trust in local subgraphs. It provides *local* trust, rather than group-level (local group) or global trust. In other words, the propagated trust of Alice from Bob is different from the trust of Alice from Charlie.

7. CONCLUSION

Trust propagation is a natural concept in settings where agents must cooperate to identify the most trustworthy parties with whom to deal. Doing so helps the agents leverage each other's knowledge, benefiting the most from each other's efforts in establishing and evaluating trust relationships, and thereby increasing the social good.

Our evidence-based approach, CertProp, provides efficient operators, concatenation, aggregation, and selection, that can propagate trust accurately. These operators satisfy useful algebraic properties.

Besides, we motivate a new way to transform subjective opinions into objective evidence based on *Weber-Fechner* law. This transformation also follows the idea that the average opinion yields the lower certainty of transformed trust. It helps reduce the subjectivity in opinion-based datasets so that the evidence-based approaches like CertProp and W&S can apply.

Our evaluation over two network datasets shows that CertProp provides accurate propagated trust. It indicates that the *Weber-Fechner* transformation successfully reduces the subjectivity in two quite different datasets. However, although the selection operator has solid theoretical basis, the subjective datasets fail to show the effectiveness of it. Also, the selection operator ignores too much evidence while it reduces double-counting.

In the future, we would like to study additional trust propagation datasets, for example, Epinions [7] and Advogate [13, 24]. Besides, we would like to enhance the capability of attack-resistance and rumor-resistance. Finally, we will refine the selection operator in order to find balance between gathering evidence and reducing double-counting.

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